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CONFIDENTIAL

A. It is generally understood that the Agency desires to develop a strong nucleus of career men from the qualified young men currently employed. As is done in the State Department, these men should be expected to fill the executive positions in the future and, on the basis of valuable experience, run the Agency along intelligent and secure lines. Primarily, these potential career men have been resigning and will continue to resign because there are too many people doing too little work. Nor is the work they are doing important enough to hold them with the Agency. Of the original 46 men in my Paramilitary class, approximately 27 are left with the Agency and half of these are subject to the draft.

B. The following reasons show specifically why young men/discouraged and dissatisfied: poor system of recruiting and assigning trained men, involving waste of Agency time, money and effort; not enough responsibility given to younger men; poor security in the field; no military credit for deserving men.

l.During the past few years the Agency hired hundreds of good men without having any planned, long-range need for them. Most of the young men were hired with assurances and promises that never developed. In 1952 the Agency found itself overstaffed, particularly, in overseas areas. Subsequently, it became more difficult to place young men in jobs corresponding to their capabilities. Once trained, there seemed to be no practical system for assigning these men. Most of them ended up with permanent jobs completely unsuited to to them—as messenger boys, filing clerks or other jobs for which women are better suited. Most of these men could have made good officers in the service, with more responsibility and

2. The feeling among younger men is that they are not being given enough responsibility or jobs that they are suited for. The matter of holding a responsible position seems to be determined more by ones GS rating than by one's pertinent experience. Younger men are usually not given a free hand at the operational level. Their ideas are passed over in the face of a conservative on Headquarters. Headquarters' remoteness from operations is an obvious and inescapable determent to operational success. Futhermore, over-cautiousness on the part of Headquarters implies a seemingly negative attitude which cuts down both incentive and concrete results in the field. Given the opportunity, capable excessive headquarters guidance.

3. We are all aware of the problems of wasted time, money and effort in the Government. But more important is the alarming lack of security which is evident in one's own work in the field. (ie. Agency failures with

and the lack of success with training are the more blatant examples.)

However, there are many smaller security lapses that cut down and spoil the

example of poor security control from beginning to end.

4. Deserving men have not been given military credit. The great majority of us entered the Agency highly motivated, prepared to serve in a useful, active role. More than showing a lack of confidence, the military credit situation shows shortsightedness by the Agency in not holding onto potential career men, who are one of its biggest assets. If credit were given to the right people. I feel that only a very megligible minority would take advantage of this provision to escape the draft. Presently many of the men are leaving the Agency with ill-feelings keen enough to keep them from rejoining.

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C. Most of us were originally sold a bill of goods and, after a rigorous training program, loosely distributed into unsuitable jobs. We found the Agency overstaffed and we did not have enough to do. What we did do, in many cases, was unimportant. Personnel policies, the situation in the field, and the lack of military credit are the other reasons why men are leaving.

Suggestions

- D. If the Agency can not better utilize its young men currently employed, it should make this clear to us now, rather than foster a continual state of indecision. This would be the first step in clearing out excess personnel. If we can be used, we would like to hear about it in honest and definite terms.
- 1. To remedy poor recruiting techniques and job assignments, give an honest picture to all applicants and don't assign them unless there is a job for them one that they agree to do.
- 2. To solve the responsibility question, capable younger men should be promoted quicker and given better jobs through merit and ability instead of time in slots, etc. This would build morale and incentive. Their progress should be followed more closely by the Career Office.
- 3. To ensure security control in the field, put security matters in the hands of the men who have been and are directly involved. This can only be done by placing younger men in more responsible positions.
- 4. If Paramilitary men were given military credit for a minimum of four years Agency service, others for four years plus basic training, many would stay with the Agency. It seems unreasonable to compel paramilitary men 25 or 26 years of age, many of whom are married and raising families, to enter the service, especially when many of them have been performing military duties, some hazardous. If they had a useful job, they would be more beneficial to the Agency. Once they have entered the service, few of them will want to return to the Agency, contrary to Personnel's beliefs. An inactive reserve unit could be formed of those who resign. These men would not be a total loss but could be called back in times of emergency.
- E. If the Agency feels that it would like to go more deeply into the ideas expressed in this report, a representative group of young men could be formed to submit a more detailed study.

